Wednesday, August 16, 2006

Obstacles to another Dayton Accord

One of my ideas for helping to deal with the sectarian violence in Iraq was to implement something like the Dayton Accords. They were reasonably successful in the Balkans.

The situation in Iraq is more complex.

http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2173&Itemid=30

Al-Qaida in Iraq, through the media and other grassroots propaganda, will promote a theme that portrays the Sunnis as under attack by coalition forces, and the government of Iraq as being corrupt. They aim to rally Sunni support by conveying al-Qaeda in Iraq as a Sunni protectorate. They then attempt to promote themselves as the defender of the oppressed instead of a terrorist organization.

Al-Qaida in Iraq is making a concerted effort to gain legitimacy by marketing itself to the Iraqi people as a credible, helpful organization that appeals to Iraqis in desperate social and economicsituations while projecting a civic-minded image. They have produced propaganda that blames coalition forces and the Iraqi government for problems such as unemployment, security, government corruption, gas prices and the lack of power, in hopes that this will empower them to take on the role as their protectorate.

Al-Qaida in Iraq wants to present itself as a legitimate organization. They're striving to increase its operational power by building a political base with a military wing, not unlike that of other extremist organizations that have turned to politics in order to grow roots.

Al-Qaida in Iraq realizes killing of innocent Iraqi civilians has damaged their public support and is working to reverse that perception. By no means does it mean they intend to stop creating sectarian violence, but rather change the perception.


So, the people of Iraq may be perfectly capable of living together afterall. The problem is (according to this briefing) outside influence. Additionally, and more troubling, these folks seem to have learned something from Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Isn't curious that Hezbollah and Al-Qaida aren't exactly buddy-buddy and yet, they seem to be employing similar tactics in terms of winning over a portion of the local population to affect their own political aims. I wonder if there's something more to this? Some shared leadership? Coordination?

Where would that come from? Iran? Maybe?

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